This paper analyzes the changes in public-private sector earnings differentials for local residents in urban China between 2002 and 2007. We find that earnings gaps across ownership sectors decreased during this period and that the convergence trend has been in favor of the private and semi-public sectors as opposed to the public sector. This trend is in sharp contrast to what occurred at the turn of the 21 st century when employees the government and state-owned enterprises were found to enjoy a privileged situation. Differences in endowments are found to play a growing role in explaining earnings differentials. However, although it is becoming less of an issue, segmentation across ownership remains important, especially for high-wage earners.
Introduction
Three decades of economic reform have brought tremendous changes to every sector of China"s economy. The labor market is no exception, and it has been particularly affected by important policy and institutional changes at the turn of the 21 st century. State sector reform accelerated after the Chinese Communist Party"s 15th Congress held in September 1997, which encouraged both the corporatization of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the restructuring of small SOEs. However, the same Congress recognized private enterprises as an important component of the economy and stressed the rule of law. As a direct consequence, the urban labor market has been reshaped through the unprecedented growth of unemployment and the reallocation of labor from the public to the private sector. In the meantime, competition among workers in the urban labor market has sharply increased due to a massive exodus of the rural labor force that saw an estimated 140 million rural workers move to cities by 2008 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010).
In the context of a transitional economy, these dramatic changes raise a number of issues regarding the direction in which the urban labor market is moving. A key aspect to be explored is whether labor is participating in a true market and whether enterprises of different ownership types operate in a competitive fashion. Academic research conducted on data collected in the 1990s and early 2000s highlighted the incompleteness of reform as well as the remaining rigidities in a labor market composed of several segments with distinct rules for wage determination and limited mobility among segments (e.g., Chen et al., 2005; Démurger et al,. 2007a; Dong & Bowles, 2002; Knight & Song, 2003; Li & Bai, 2005) .
Moreover, with the growth of China"s economy and rising average urban wages, earnings gaps have triggered a vigorous debate in China. Among recent studies that document the world"s fastest recent growth in labor earnings, Ge and Yang (2010) indicate that the earning gains in China between 1992 and 2007 is the result of a conjunction of growth in basic wages and in wage premiums not only related to skills, but also with regard to enterprise ownership. In particular, they find much higher gains in wage premiums for state employees than for non-state employees. In the Chinese context, enterprise ownership is an important question because it is linked with the issue of whether the
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4 government can provide an equal and efficient business environment for all types of companies to develop and maximize social welfare. Given that the number of enterprises in the public sector decreased from about 99% of total companies in 1978 to merely 10% in 2007, it is also interesting to investigate whether the remaining companies in the public sector still enjoy a privileged position in the labor market because of particular government policies.
There is a vast body of literature on public-private wage differentials in both developed and developing countries. 1 Research on developed countries has shown that the public sector pays more on average than the private sector, not only because public employees have better qualifications but also because they enjoy higher returns for their productivity. Empirical investigations of European transitional economies have highlighted different patterns with a wage premium in favor of the private sector after economic liberalization (Adamchick & Bedi, 2000; Leping, 2006; Lokshin & Jovanovic, 2003) . This wage gap is especially large for educated employees; this condition has been interpreted as adding further difficulties in attempts by the state sector to retain skilled workers. With regard to China, evidence from the mid-nineties shows that workers in the public sector had little incentive to move to a different sector. The major reason for this immobility was that the higher-than-market-clearing-level earnings premium provided to workers in state-owned units (Chen et al., 2005; Zhao, 2002) .
Furthermore, segmentation across ownership sectors continued to increase until the end of the 1990s with the gap between the privileged segments of the labor market and the most competitive segments widening over time (Démurger et al., 2007a) .
The release of new data from the Project on Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMIC-2007) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the development of various types of enterprises in China. Section 3 introduces the dataset along with some descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses econometric results on earnings equations by enterprise ownership.
Section 5 and Section 6 present decomposition results of earnings gaps across ownership sectors during the period ranging from 2002-07. Section 7 contains the conclusion.
Economic reforms and the evolution of ownership
After China became a socialist country in 1949, most of the means of production belonged to the state, and private and individual economic activities were made illegal. Therefore, within the period of the first five-year plan, the percentage of public ownership increased from 21.3% in 1952 to 92.9% in 1956. When economic reforms were initiated in 1978, the national economy was dominated by publicly owned companies, which consisted of state-owned companies and collective enterprises.
State-owned companies and collective enterprises accounted for 24% and 76%, respectively, of the total number of industrial companies and 78% and 22%, respectively, of total industrial production.
One major aspect of China"s economic reform was to encourage the development of the non-state sector in the economy. Through revising a series of laws and regulations, the government gradually Non-State-Owned Economic Development" in order to reduce barriers to market entry and to stimulate private investment.
The development of the non-state sector helped promote competition among all of the companies as well as allocate resources more efficiently. Before the reform, because resources were allocated according to a national plan and the economy was dominated by public ownership, there was no competition among enterprises or employees. Allowing private and foreign companies to enter the labor market made it possible to improve the national economy as a whole and to promote prosperity.
The other advantage was the alleviation of employment pressure. With the baby boom and soldiers transferring to non-military sectors, the labor force increased by more than 10 million every year, and the non-state sector became a major channel for absorbing this growing labor force.
Hence, whereas employment in the public sector had continued to rise continuously until the mid-1990s, it began to decrease in 1995 with a huge deceleration in 1998 (-18%), which was the pivotal year in SOE reforms. Since that year, the number of workers in both SOEs and urban collective enterprises (UCEs) has continued to decrease, from 144.6 million in 1995 to 71.4 million in 2007
(National Bureau of Statistics 2008) for a total decrease of 50%. The public sector share in urban employment dropped from 76% to 24% over the same period. In contrast to the downsizing of the public sector, the private sector share in urban employment has increased from 16% in 1995 to 42% in experienced during the process of moving the labor force from the public to the private sector.
Urban wage-setting mechanisms have also fundamentally evolved over the period of these reforms.
2 By giving more autonomy to SOEs to determine wages and bonuses, the 1994 wage reform led to a gradual shift from state-sector wage grids based on seniority to more flexible wage settings. As highlighted by Knight and Li (2005) , wages became more strongly linked to the profitability of the enterprise in the 1990s, which contributed to a widening of wage inequality between employees of loss-making firms and those of profit-making firms. The restructuring of SOEs from 1997 onward further impacted the wage structure by redistributing the working population into the private sector where wages are linked to individual productivity. Moreover, as documented by Xing (2010) , compensation in the state-owned sector became more sensitive to work performance at the beginning of the 2000s as part of an effort to move closer to market mechanisms in the determination of wages.
Data and descriptive analysis

Summary statistics by ownership
The data used in this paper come from two sources: the Chinese Household Income Project, Enterprise ownership as analyzed in this paper is divided into five categories (see Table 1 ):
3 Although the sampling design for both surveys is based on that of the annual urban household survey conducted by the NBS, there is one discrepancy between the two datasets that is worth mentioning here. Indeed, the RUMIC-2007 data were collected from the NBS new sample. Table 2 ).
Descriptive statistics on individual characteristics by ownership sector are shown in Table 2 where females were traditionally overrepresented (Démurger et al., 2007b; Maurer-Fazio et al., 1999) . Finally, the kurtosis is the highest in SOEs, suggesting a sharper peak and fatter tails of hourly earnings distribution in the state sector.
The evolution of earnings and their distribution by ownership
The determinants of hourly earnings
Tables 4 and 5 present OLS estimations of an augmented Mincerian hourly earnings function (Mincer, 1974) run separately by enterprise ownership and by year. 11 The Mincerian earnings equation takes the following form:
where subscript r [1, 5] represents the five different ownership categories defined above; w ir is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings (adjusted for provincial purchasing power differences) for individual i in enterprise r; X ir is a vector of her individual socio-demographic characteristics and  10 This may reflect our ownership classification. Indeed, FIEs only include foreign-owned enterprises and foreign-controlled enterprises, which are mainly concentrated in higher-end industries. 11 Card (1999) provides a brief introduction of all kinds of estimating methods and their respective advantages and disadvantages on the return to education. He argues that the OLS estimating method is still the most robust technique.
13
provides the set of returns for each observed characteristic. X includes gender, education (measured in years of schooling as reported in the surveys), work experience 12 and its square, work experience in the current occupation, on-the-job training (dummy variable) and regional dummies for coastal provinces and for capital cities. 13 The residual u ir stands for all the unobservable factors that may affect individual hourly earnings w.
Returns to education are significant in all sectors for both years and are the highest in FIEs. A comparison over time also reveals interesting changes: 14 while returns to education remain stable in experience in FIEs can be related to the fact that workers in these enterprises are younger and have 12 Because the actual work experience is not reported in the 2007 survey, we use potential work experience, defined as age minus years in school minus six, for both years. Nevertheless, earnings regressions using actual work experience for the year 2002 indicate that there is no obvious bias in using potential work experience instead of actual work experience. 13 It is widely recognized that excluding relevant exogenous variables from the wage regression may bias upward the unexplained part in the subsequent decomposition. However, some of these explanatory variables, including industry and occupation, are clearly choice variables and are, therefore, endogenous with no variable in our dataset to credibly instrument those endogenous variables. In the absence of reliable instruments, we had to make a statistical compromise between endogeneity and omitted variables. We chose to limit the potential for endogeneity bias by using a sparse set of right-hand side variables in the earnings equation. The potential omitted variable bias should then be kept in mind during the interpretation of the results. 14 Although coefficients are not directly comparable across years, the significance of the difference has been checked by pooling the data and adding interaction terms for all variables with a ""2007" dummy.
14 less experience than in other types of enterprises (see Table 2 ). 15 The introduction of another indicator of experience that measures the number of years in the company adds some interesting results for foreign-invested firms. Indeed, the associated coefficient for FIEs, which is significantly higher in 2007 than in 2002, indicates that the experience that counts for FIEs is experience that accumulated in the enterprise rather than overall experience (which may have been accumulated in the less efficient public or semi-public sectors).
Returns to gender also exhibit noteworthy differences across ownership and over time. 
Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions
In order to analyze earnings differentials between individuals belonging to different enterprises, we first use the Oaxaca-Blinder method (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) to decompose mean 15 Interestingly, the absence of a significant wage premium for job experience in the foreign sector is persistent over time (see Chen et al., 2005) . As for UCEs, the non-significant relationship between experience and wage levels seems more unusual. One explanation might be related to the relatively small sample size of UCEs for both years. Additionally, one may argue in line with Appleton et al., (2005) that insignificant returns to experience in the urban collective sector are consistent with a move toward a more competitive labor market in which seniority is no longer overvalued.
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15 differences in log earnings into two components: one that is attributable to the differences in mean endowments of workers across ownership and one that is attributable to differences in returns to these endowments.
The observed average log-earnings difference between two enterprises of different ownership, r 1 and r 2 , can be defined as: where hats denote estimated coefficients from separate earnings equations.
Assuming that a non-discriminatory wage structure  * is known, the log-wage differential can be decomposed in the following way:
Equation (4) shows that the earnings gap between ownership r 1 and ownership r 2 can be decomposed into two parts. The first term can be interpreted as the part of the log-earnings differential, due to differences in average individual characteristics between different ownerships. It measures how much individuals in ownership r 1 would earn if they had the same characteristics as those in ownership r 2 . The second (bracketed) term represents the amount by which earnings between two different ownership sectors differ from the assumed non-discriminatory wage structure. This term is the "unexplained" or residual component of the earnings gap. This effect can be interpreted as the part due either to segmentation or to different productivity levels. In other words, the fact that individuals with the same characteristics are paid differently in different ownership sectors might be due to different production processes that result in different individual productivity levels across ownership sectors or to particular institutional factors, such as monopolistic power, that lead to the return gap.
Several approaches to estimating the non-discriminatory wage structure  * have been adopted in the literature. Following Oaxaca"s (1973) seminal paper, one may assume that discrimination is directed toward one group only and take the other group"s wage structure as the non-discriminatory structure. However, this assumption leads to the well-known "index number problem," resulting in halshs-00627719, version 1 -30 Sep 2011 16 various weighting schemes being put forward in the empirical literature (Neumark, 2008; Jann, 2008; Elder et al., 2010) . In this paper, we follow Jann"s (2008) suggestion and take a pooled wage structure (as in Neumark, 1988 ) that includes an indicator variable for group membership as the non-discriminatory wage structure. Table 6 The decomposition analysis presented in Table 6 highlights three main phenomena on the ownership dimension. These are of importance to understanding the recent evolution of the labor market in urban China. First, both urban collectives and private enterprises have seen their relative position dramatically improve compared to the public sector. Indeed, compared to both SOEs and GAIs, the huge decrease in the earnings gap comes from two concomitant forces: a convergence in endowments and a sharp reduction of segmentation against UCEs and PIEs. This change is important in the sense that it signals better integration of the domestic sectors (public, semi-public or private), which had never before occurred.
The convergence changes observed between the private and the public sectors can be related to the resurgence of private businesses. For a long time, the supply of capital and technologies was comparatively scarce, while the supply of cheap labor was large. These factors made the marginal return on capital and technologies much higher than the return on labor. The comparative advantage of SOEs and FIEs was obvious because they are endowed with sufficient capital and advanced technologies. In recent years, the development of the capital market enabled some private companies to finance sufficient capital and to invest in high technologies in order to attain economies of scale. In addition, the fact that the social burden (e.g., the wages for retired employees) was much smaller for the non-public sector than for SOEs also contributed to narrowing wage differences between the public and the private sectors.
Second, although the dominant position of GAIs was diminishing between 2002 and 2007, the still comparatively higher wages in GAIs may be attributed more importantly to employees" better endowments compared to other sectors. This finding is especially true when GAIs are compared to UCEs and PIEs: differences in endowments account respectively for 50% and 62% of the earnings gap with GAIs in 2007, while the shares were only 13% and 30% in 2002. Put differently, the strong increase in segmentation in favor of GAIs that had been observed in the early 2000s was diminishing during the recent period both in absolute terms and as a share of log earnings differences. This development may indicate a trend toward reduced protection of earnings in public administration.
Third, the foreign sector continued to reinforce its position through both better worker characteristics, as well as more pronounced segmentation, especially as compared to the public sector. 
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition approach only treats the mean of the distribution and ignores differences along the distribution, such as its dispersion or skewness. However, as shown in Section 3, the distribution of hourly earnings differs across sectors. Therefore, to complement the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, we use the decomposition technique proposed by Juhn et al., (1993) , which takes the whole earnings distribution into account.
The Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition method extends the Oaxaca-Blinder approach by accounting for the residual distribution in order for the hourly earnings gap can be decomposed into three parts: the individual characteristics effect (resulting from a change in the distribution of the Xs), the return or "price" effect (resulting from a change in the s) and the residual effect (or unobservable factors" influence).
Following Juhn et al., (1993) , the residual u ir in equation (1) The first hypothetical set of wages given in equation (6) SOEs were paying comparatively higher wages to low-wage earners, while FIEs were offering higher wages to the 75 th percentile, which made the gap change signs over the distribution (and may explain why the mean difference reported in Table 6 is not significant). Interestingly, while the gap in favor of SOEs at the bottom of the distribution appears to be equally explained by differences in quantity, price and residuals, the gap in favor of FIEs at the top of the distribution was mainly explained by different remuneration of characteristics (which more than compensated the superior characteristics of SOEs workers).
Fourth, as previously discussed, earnings differentials have substantially shrunk between 2002
and 2007 for almost all pairs of sectors. Whole distributions provide a more complete view of this average evolution by highlighting some differences along the earnings distribution curve. Hence, the reduction in earnings gap tends to be more pronounced at the bottom of the distribution because of a decreasing segmentation. This finding is particularly true for the pairs SOEs-GAIs and UCEs-GAIs, suggesting that in the public sector, the wage structure has become more harmonized for the low-wage earners. In addition, distribution patterns for different ownerships sectors at various percentiles have changed substantially, suggesting that wage-setting mechanisms have experienced considerable changes during this period. In this respect, the foreign sector exhibits particularly interesting changes. 
Conclusion
This paper analyzes wages inequality trends across ownership sectors for the period 2002-07 and investigates the mechanisms at stake by decomposing the mean wages difference using the Oaxaca-Blinder technique and analyzing the wages gap distribution through utilization of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition method.
We find that while average earnings gaps were still fairly large across ownership sectors in 2002, they shrank over the ensuing five-year period extending to 2007. Moreover, the observed earnings convergence took place in favor of the private and semi-public sectors as opposed to the public sector.
In terms of earnings differentials across the distribution, the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition highlights a comparatively equal distribution within the public sector, while most of the gap for the private domestic sector comes at the bottom of the distribution. As for foreign-invested enterprises, the clear improvement of their position with regard to the public sector between 2002 and 2007 can be 23 observed over the whole distribution, which implies that workers in foreign-invested firms all have benefited from the improved position of these enterprises.
Both the Oaxaca-Blinder and the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions illustrate that differences in endowments gained importance over time in accounting for earnings gaps as well as for the general decreasing trend in earnings differences across ownership sectors. However, segmentation began to become a less important issue in 2007 compared to 2002. In particular, our results highlight a better integration of domestic sectors that never before occurred. These findings also show that the segmentation in favor of GAIs, which was fairly strong in 2002, has been disappearing over time,
although not throughout the whole distribution. Indeed, Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions indicate that segmentation remains important for high-wage earners, which suggests that workers at the top of the distribution are still benefiting from some protection as compared to workers at the low end.
These findings suggest that there are two directions in which the urban labor market in China is moving. The marketization of labor allocation and wage determination is clearly becoming more visible with the process of reforms in the economy as a whole. However, there are clear remaining lines of rigidities, and not all workers are given the same opportunities to benefit from the changes.
Our finding that the difference between the public and the private sectors mostly comes from the bottom portion of the distribution clearly points to such a policy issue. In order to achieve a fairer earnings distribution across ownership sectors, a policy goal could be to break the hurdles to entering the public sector for individuals with comparatively inferior characteristics. Moreover, given that we only consider urban locals, we can reasonably expect that the earnings gap that we estimate is in fact a lower bound of the "true" earnings gap if rural migrants were also included. This possibility reinforces the need for alleviating labor mobility obstacles between sectors, industries and areas and improving individuals" overall educational level to reduce access-to-job and earnings inequalities between the bottom and the top of the distribution. Table 2 . Notes: Earnings are deflated using the urban provincial-level spatial price deflators calculated by Brandt and Holz (2006) Table 2 . Notes: see Table 2 . Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Earnings are deflated using the urban provincial-level spatial price deflators calculated by Brandt and Holz (2006) Table 2 . Notes: see Table 2 . Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Decompositions based on regressions results presented in Tables 4 and 5 . Earnings are deflated using the urban provincial-level spatial price deflators calculated by Brandt and Holz (2006) Table 2 . Earnings are deflated using the urban provincial-level spatial price deflators calculated by Brandt and Holz (2006) 
